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A CRITIQUE OF THE MOTIVATIONAL
ANALYSIS IN WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
CASES
Abstract: Most states now recognize a tort cause of action for wrongful
conception, typically resulting from a failed sterilization. States differ; how-
ever; in determining whether damages should be awarded for child-rearing
expenses and what factors juries can consider in setting such damage
awards. This Note argues that one commonly used factor; the parents' moti-
vation for selecting sterilization, is irrelevant and leads to inequitable re-
sults. Since the right to use contraception is constitutionally protected, the
choice to sterilize in order to avoid financial burdens associated with child-
rearing should not be given preferential treatment to sterilizations motivated
by concerns of genetic defects or for the mother's health.
INTRODUCTION
On April 1, 1967 a picture of a mother and a child appeared in
the San Francisco Chronicle with the following description:
When Kathleen Holloway had her tenth child two years ago,
a family consultant advised her to have no more children
since her husband made $40 a week as a London bone and
rag picker. The consultant thought the Pill wasn't enough, so
on his recommendation Mrs. Holloway had a sterilizing op-
eration. Apparently that wasn't enough either. She gave birth
to a 9-pound 3-ounce girl at St. Mary's Hospital. The doctors
are still trying to figure out what happened.'
Situations like the one just described are typical in wrongful concep-
tion cases. 2 Although the birth of a child after a sterilization proce-
dure is not necessarily a result of the physician's negligence, there are
many instances where the doctor has been negligent in performing
the procedure by not performing the operation properly, not provid-
ing post-operative care or failing to notify the patient of the risks in-
volved.3 This Note focuses on those cases where a doctor negligently
Gustodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rpm 463, 465 n.2 (Ct. App. 1967).
2See id.
-See Amy Norwood Moore, Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the
Wrongful Birth. of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. Rev. 1311, 1313, 1329-30 (1982); Lisa A. Po-
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performs a sterilization procedure resulting in the birth of a child.
These cases generally fall under what has come to be known as a
cause of action for wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy. 4
Today, pre-natal torts and birth-related causes of action have be-
come more accepted by courts and legislatures nationwide. 5 There is
still controversy, however, as to the kinds of damages that are recover-
able.6
 In wrongful conception cases, courts attempt to balance plain-
tiffs' injuries with public policy concerns involving the valuation of
infant's lives.' In balancing these interests, courts have used different
rules and sometimes have deviated from traditional tort law princi-
ples, 8
 This Note explores the various approaches used by courts in
awarding child-rearing damages. 9 The majority of courts have not al-
lowed full recovery for child-rearing damages. 1 ° Some courts have de-
vised various tools to limit the damages recoverable and thus, prevent
recovery for Child-rearing expenses." This Note seeks to demonstrate
that one of those tools, the motivational analysis, does not produce
the best results in wrongful conception cases. 12
clewils, Note, Traditional Tort Principles and itirongful Conception Child-Rearing Damages, B.U.
L. REV. 407, 410-11 (1993).
4
 There is no universal distinction between the terms wrongful birth, wrongful life,
wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy. See Jill E. Garfinkle, Note, Burke v. Rim
"Award a More Rational Approach to Wrongful Pregnancy, 36 VtLL. L. Rix. 805, 807 (1991).
Wrongful birth is usually a suit brought by the parents of a defective child against a physi-
cian for failure to diagnose problems with the fetus and the parents claim that due to the
pl tysician's negligence they were deprived from exercising their right to choose whether to
abort or keep the fetus. See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Recoverability of Cost of Rais-
ing a Normal, Healthy Child Born as Result of Physician's Negligence or Breach of Contract or Mir-
rarity, 89 A.L.R. 4th 632, § 1(a) (1991). Wrongful life is an action brought by the parents
on behalf of a defective child where they seek damages for the impaired life the child now
has to live as a result of the physician's negligence. See id. Wrongful pregnancy or wrongful
conception is an action brought. by the parents of a normal and healthy but unplanned
child in order to recover damages from a physician for allegedly causing a conception or
pregnancy to occur when the couple had sought the doctor's assistance to avoid such oc-
currence. See Garfinkle, supra at 808. Some courts and treatises, however, use all of these
terms interchangeably and usually use the term wrongful birth as all-encompassing. See id.
at 807.
5 See Renee Madeleine flour, Note, Wrongful Conception: North Carolina's Newest Prenatal
Claim---Jackson v. Biting :whiter, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1077, 1077 (1987).
6 See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 79-158 and accompanying text.
11 See it 	 notes 134-58 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 327-409 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the development of
the cause of action for wrongful conception and discusses the four
major approaches used in awarding damages in these cases. 15 Part II
discusses endorsements and criticisms of the offset benefits rule used
by some courts to calculate damages for child-rearing expenses in
wrongful conception cases." Part III discusses the different applica-
tions of the motivational analysis in offset benefits jurisdictions. 15 Fi-
nally, Part IV analyzes the use of a motivational inquiry in wrongful
conception cases and questions whether it produces the best results. 16
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
Wrongful conception is an action brought by the parents of a
normal, healthy but unplanned child in order to recover damages
from a physician for allegedly causing a conception or pregnancy
when the couple had sought the physician's assistance in avoiding
such occurrence. 17 Wrongful conception claims are generally in-
cluded as part of an action for medical malpractice. 18 The first suits
for negligent performance of a sterilization procedure where a
healthy child was born were based on claims for misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit. 19 Today, claimS range from breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duties to negligence." The vast majority of cases
involve the negligent performance of sterilization procedures such as
tubal ligations or vasectomies. 21 There also have been cases dealing
with the liability of a pharmacist for negligently filling a prescription
for birth control pills. 22
The development of the cause of action for wrongful conception
was hindered because, historically, contraception, sterilization and
IS See Wiz, notes 17-158 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 159-216 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 217-326 and accompanying text.
16 Sr infra notes 327-409 and accompanying (ext.
17 Some authors make a further distinction between wrongful conception and wrong-
ful pregnancy. See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 808-09. According to them, wrongful concep-
tion arc those situations when the negligence occurs during the preconception phase such
as the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure. See id. IA5'011011 pregnancy en-
compasses cases where the negligent act occurs after conception such as the negligent
performance of an abortion or a failure to diagnose a pregnancy in time to be able to
choose an abortion. See Hom, supra note 5, at 1083.
18 See limn, supra note 5, at 1077.
19 See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornhy, 255 NW. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934).
2° See infra notes 29-78 and accompanying (ext.
21 See, e.g., infra notes 58-158,222-326 . and accompanying (ext.
22 See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d.511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
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abortion were not recognized as legal options in many jurisdictions. 25
Furthermore, courts reasoned that public policy considerations would
preclude recovery for the birth of a child, particularly if the child was
born healthy.24 According to these courts, the birth of a healthy child
was a blessing and not a cognizable injury. 25
In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held
that a woman's right to family planning was a constitutional right. 26
Along with Wade, other important United States Supreme Court deci-
sions recognized contraception, sterilization and abortion as constitu-
tional rights.27
 Those cases provided the impetus for the acceptance
of wrongful conception, wrongful birth and other similar causes of
action which have developed over the last thirty years. 28
A. Chronological Development of Wrongful Conception Claims
Christensen v. Thornby was the first reported case to deal with an
action based on a failed sterilization procedure which resulted in the
birth of a healthy child.28 ,In 1934, in Christensen, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held that the performance of a sterilization procedure
and 'a contract to perforM such a procedure are not against public
policy, at least, when medical necessity is involved. 30 The court, how-
ever, dismissed the plaintiff's claims because they were based on a
theory of deceit and there was no showing by the plaintiffs of a
fraudulent intent to deceiVe. 31 In Christensen, the husband underwent
a vasectomy because lie was advised that it would be dangerous for his
wife to bear another child. 52 The defendant, a doctor, performed the
23 See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 621-22.
24 See id. at 621,622.
SeeCustodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rpm 463,473 (Ct. App. 1967); Christensen, 255 N.W. at
622.
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 See generally Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right to use contraceptives by unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contraceptives by married persons).
See Wade, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Benja-
min Lee Locklar, Note, Jackson v. Bumgardner: A Healthy Newborn—A Blessing or a Curse?,
12 Am." TRIAL ADVOC. 153,153 (1988).
29 See 255 N.W. at 621 (discussing the lack of authority cited by the parties because
there were no reported cases where a person who consented to a sterilization procedure
brought suit against a surgeon).
3° See id.
31 See id. at 622.
32 See id. at 621.
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operation and guaranteed sterility." Subsequently, the wife became
pregnant and delivered a healthy baby without major complications to
her health." The husband grounded his suit solely in deceit because
he claimed that the doctor fraudulently represented to him that the
operation was successful and that it would prevent conception." The
.husband made no claims as to whether the doctor negligently per-
formed the operation. 36 The Christensen court reasoned that the hus-
band did not have a cause of action for deceit because he did not
show the requisite element of fraudulent intent. 37
 According to the
court, there was no fraudulent intent because the operation was per-
formed and its purpose was fulfilled—to save the wife from hazards
incident to childbirth. 38 Moreover, the court viewed the birth of a
healthy child as a blessing and not as an injury."
The Christensen court, however, implied that the plaintiff may
have have been successful on claims for breach of contract or medical
malpractice if the plaintiff had sued on those theories. 40 To the court,
a contract to perform the sterilization procedure was not void as
against public policy because there was no statutory provision in the
state of Minnesota prohibiting sterilization." The Christensen court
further reasoned that even if there was such a prohibition, an excep-
tion is made by most other states when medical necessity requires the
operation.42 In Christensen, the husband's motivation for submitting to
a vasectomy was to protect his wife from another pregnancy which
would have been detrimental to her health.45 Thus, the court held
that in this case, the operation and the contract to perform the sterili-
zation were not void as against public policy."
The court in Christensen only dealt with a claim of deceit; the first
reported case to use a negligence approach in a failed sterilization
case where a healthy child was born was Ball v. Mudge. 45
 In 1964, in
33
 See id,
" See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 021.
35 See id. at 622.
36 See id. al 621.
37 See id. al 622.
38
 See id.
39 See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 622.
411 See id.
41 See id. at 021.
42
 See id,
43 See id.
4'1 See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 622.
45 See 391 1'.2d 201 (Wash. 1964). West v. Underwood was the first reported negligence
case dealing with a failed sterilization. See 40 A.2d 610 (N.J. 1945). In West, however, the
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Ball, the Washington Supreme Court held that a doctor's negligence
in performing a vasectomy was not the proximate cause of the preg-
nancy of the plaintiffs wife.* The husband had a vasectomy because
his wife was advised by an obstetrician that further deliveries would be.
dangerous to her health after already delivering three children by Ce-
sarean section. 47
 In addition, the husband and his wife were unable to
afford the expense of raising another child." The husband submitted
to a vasectomy and resumed relations with his wife." The doctor did
not advise the husband to undergo post-operative testing for fertility
nor did he provide any type of post-operative care." The wife became
pregnant and delivered a healthy child, again by Cesarean section,
without any major complications to her health. 51 The husband and his
wife sued the doctor in negligence, claiming that the doctor failed to
successfully sterilize the husband and departed from standard medical
practice by not providing post-operative care. 52 The husband sought
recovery for the expenses associated with the delivery, care, mainte-
nance and support of the child as well as the pain and suffering of the
parents."
The Ball court, in denying the negligence claim, reasoned that
the doctor's actions were not the proximate cause of the pregnancy
because it was medically possible for the husband to become fertile
after a vasectomy.54
 Therefore, the wife's pregnancy did not necessar-
ily mean that the doctor was negligent in performing the Nusectomy. 55
Although the doctor did not provide post-operative care to the plain-
. tiff, the court nevertheless reasoned that the doctor had not departed
from the usual standard of care in the community. 56 Moreover, it was
reasonable for the jury to conclude that plaintiffs suffered no damage
from the birth of a healthy child because they loved the child clearly
consequences of the failed procedure were abscesses over the incision and deep pain, not
the birth of a child. See id. Therefore, the discussion of that case is omitted in this Note.
45 See Hall, 391 P.2d at 203-04.
47 See id. at 203.
48
 See id.
49
 See id.
5° See id. at 203.
51 See Ball, 391 1'.2d at 203.
52 See id.
55 See id.
See id. at 203-04.
55 See id. at 204.
56 See Ball, 391 P.2d at 204.
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and would not consider placing the child for adoption nor "selling it
for $50,000. "57
It was not long before other jurisdictions started using the negli-
gence approach. 58 In 1967, the California Court of Appeals, in Custo-
dio v. Baum; was the first court to hold in a suit for wrongful concep-
tion in negligence that a physician's actions was the proximate cause
of childbirth and that child-rearing damages was compensable even if
a healthy child is born. 59 In Custodio, a husband and a wife, sought
recovery front their doctors on seven different causes of action having
to do with the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure
where the wife's fallopian tubes were to be partially removed.° The
husband and his wife wanted to undergo this treatment because they
were told that another pregnancy, after having nine children, would
aggravate the wife's bladder and kidney conditions. 61 Almost a year
after the surgery, the husband discovered that his wife was pregnant
despite the doctors' assurances of a successful operation.° The wife
gave birth to a healthy baby and sought monetary damages for the
costs of delivery, emotional distress and child-rearing expenses for the
care of the child until the age of majority. 63
The Custodio court recognized the doctor's actions as the proxi-
mate cause of the pregnancy and stated "it is difficult to conceive how
the very act the consequences of which the operation was designed to
forestall, can be considered unforeseeable." 64 In addition, the court
reasoned that public policy did not prevent the recognition of a cause
of action for failed sterilization because the United States Supreme
Court had recognized a constitutional right in the use of contracep-
tion and sterilization.° According to the Custodio court, damages for
the delivery were compensable because the birth of the child was an
obvious foreseeable consequence of the doctor's negligence and ster-
ilization procedures were no longer illegal or against public policy. 66
The court also implied that the husband and wife could recover for
57 Id.
58 See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Sup!). 460, 463 (S.1). W. Va. 19(57); Custodio, 59 Cal. Rini:
at 466.
59 See Custodio, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 166, 472.
G° See id. at 466.
61 See id.
62 See id.
65 See id. at 467&n.3.n.
64 Castodio, 59 Cal. Rpir. at 472.
65 Sec id. at 473 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
66 See id. at 473, 477.
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the mental and physical complications the operation was designed to
prevent.67 Furthermore, the court reasoned that child-rearing ex-
penses could be compensable because the family suffered a loss by the
birth of the child; this was a foreseeable consequence of the doctor's
negligence. 68 The Custodio court, however, made clear that the dam-
ages were not for the "unwanted" child but to "replenish the family
exchequer so that the new arrival would not deprive other members
of the family of what was planned as their just share of the family in-
come."69 According to the court, this is not against public policy be-
cause there is a trend in social ethics towards contraception and fam-
ily planning as a means of ensuring the "economic betterment of .. .
the population."70
In sum, plaintiffs seeking compensation for negligently per-
formed sterilization procedures have used various theories in order to
persuade courts to accept a cause of action for wrongful conception."
At first, it was impossible to achieve recovery because sterilization was
illegal in many jurisdictions. 72 Therefore, efforts by plaintiffs concen-
trated on using theories having to do with deceit and misrepresenta-
tion, claiming that the doctors guaranteed sterility after the opera-
tions:78
 By 1934, however, one court recognized that breach of
contract claims could be recognized if the sterilization was performed
to protect the mother's health; this practice did not become wide-
spread since many states still did not recognize sterilization proce-
dures or contracts to perform them as lega1. 74 .More importantly, how-
ever, the most probable reason for the sporadic use of a breach of
contract claim had to do with the fact that doctors were usually care-
ful not to guarantee a result in their written or oral contracts. 75 Even a
few years before sterilization and contraception were recognized as
legal rights under the United States Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court in 1965, there were failed attempts by plaintiffs to
67 See id. at 476. The court implied that the husband and wife could not recover be-
cause at the time of the lawsuit ihe . wife had not given birth to the child. See id. at 467 11.3.
Thus, the plaintiffs could not prove mental and physical complications at the time of the
suit. See id.
68 See id. at 476.
60 Gus/odic. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
7° Id. at 477.
71
 See supra notes 29-70 and accompanying text.
72 See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 621.
73 See supra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
7.1 See Christensen, 255 N.W. at 621.
73 See Bishop, 265 F. Stipp. at 463.
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ground their claims in negligence. 76
 Those negligence claims were
not successful until after the Custodio decision in 1967. 77
 Undoubtedly,
Supreme Court decisions dealing with reproductive rights have been
the main impetus towards the acceptance of the cause of action of
wrongful conception; these decisions stand for the precept that inju-
ries to those constitutional rights are legally compensable. 78
B. Four Different Approaches to Damages
Today, wrongful conception is a widely accepted cause of action. 79
Much controversy, however, arises from the various methods used to
calculate damages." Compensation for child-rearing expenses for the
birth of a healthy child is the most controversial aspect of damage
awards. 81 In fact, most courts. today still refuse to award damages for
the full cost of these child-rearing expenses. 82 The compensation
theories used by courts can be grouped into four categories: (1) total
denial of recovery; (2) limited recovery; (3) full recovery; and (4) off-
set benefits."
1. Total Denial of Recovery
Until twenty years ago, when the incidence of pre-natal torts in-
creased, the total denial of recovery approach 84
 was the predominant
approach used by courts in wrongful conception actions." Currently,
only two jurisdictions, Kansas and Nevada, still adhere to this ap-
proach, neither recognizing the tort nor awarding damages in wrong-
ful conception claims." The supreme courts of these two states rely
on the old common law rationale used to deny this cause of action-
76 See Ball, 391 P.2(1 at 202.
77 See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
79 See id. at 473; Locklar, supra note 28, at 153.
79 See Christopher D. Jerram, Note. Child Rearing Expenses as Compensable Damage in
Wrong/id Conception Case: Burke v. Rico, 24 Camcarrorr L. Ry.v. 1643, 1643 (1991); Lisa A.
Podewils, supra note 3, at 408.
go See Lockla•, supra note 28, at 163-67; Moore, supra note 3. at 1315-23; Stephen M.
O'Shea, Comment, Burke v. Rico: A Massachusetts Approach to Wro»gfitl Pregnancy, 26 NEw.
ENG. L. REv. 963, 968-74 (1992).
sl See Podewils, supra note 3, at 408.
82 See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
83 See O'Shea, supra note 80, at 968-74:
See Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Nev. 1986).
85 See Hon' , supra note 5, at 1077.
86 See Byrd v. Wesley Med. Ctr„ 699 P.2d 459, 468 (Ran. 1985); Szehereu, 715 P.2d at
1077-78.
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that the birth of a healthy child is not a harm. 87 Therefore, as a matter
of public policy, these courts rule that there is no cause of action for
wrongful conception."
For example, in 1986, the Nevada Supreme Court, in Szekeres v.
Robinson, declined to award any damages for wrongful conception,
and held that such cases were not to be analyzed under a negligence
scheme. 89 The Szekeres court found that even if the doctor's negligent
or careless conduct contributed to the birth of a child, it would not
rise to a tort liability in negligence because the birth of a healthy baby
was not a legally compensable damage." Nevertheless, the court
stated that its denial of tart liability did not mean that plaintiffs could
not recover under a breach of contract claim. 91 According to the
court, the damages in a breach of contract claim would be limited to
the cost of medical, surgical and hospital care associated with the
failed surgery.92
In Szekeres, a woman who underwent surgical sterilization became
pregnant and delivered a healthy baby girl." She sued her attending
physicians and the hospital where the surgery was performed on the
theory that she, the newborn and the newborn's siblings had been
damaged by the baby's birth.94
 The newborn's father claimed that he
was damaged by the wife's unavailability during the pregnancy." The
court, in denying the existence of a cause of action for wrongful con-
ception in negligence, reasoned that the wrongness or the injurious-
ness of the birth should not be taken for granted because the birth of
a healthy child is not a wrong but a "right."96 For the Szekeres court, the
birth of a healthy child distinguishes a claim of wrongful conception
from ordinary medical negligence actions.97 The court explained that
in medical malpractice actions, the results of the doctor's negligence
are injuries such as death or disabilities." In wrongful conception
87 See Szekeres, 715P.2(1 at 1077-78.
88 See id.
" See id. at 1079.
90 See id. at 1077.
81
 See id. at 1077.
" See Szekeres, 715 P.2c1 at 1079.
" See id. at 1076.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 1077.
96 See id. at 1078.
97 See Szekeres, 715 P.M. at 1078 & n.3.
98 See id. at 1078.
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cases, on the other hand, the court explained that the alleged wrong
is not an injury for which society should give reparation. 99
2. Limited Recovery
The second approach to damages in wrongful conception cases is
the limited recovery view."° This approach is the one espoused by a
majority of jurisdictions in the United States.ml The courts using this
method allow damages for harm that is the direct result of the physi-
cian's negligence but preclude recovery for child-rearing expenses. 192
According to these courts, a parent should not be awarded the costs
of child rearing because such damages are too speculative. 103 These
courts also reason that: (1) the benefits of a healthy child outweigh
any economic loss; (2) child rearing expenses are disproportionate to
the doctor's 'culpability; and (3) there are devastating psychological
effects when a child later finds out he or she was unwanted and that
someone else is paying to rear him. 104 In declining to award child-
rearing expenses, these courts also are concerned with the possible
increase in fraudulent claims and the difficulty in drawing a line to
stop the physician's liability. 10
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Johnson v. University Hos-
pitals, held that the limited recovery theory was the most appropriate
in a wrongful conception action. 106 In Johnson, a woman had under-
gone a tubal ligation which was negligently performed by three doc-
tors. 107 She later became pregnant and realized that she had not been
sterilized. 108 As a result, she delivered a healthy child and sued her
doctors for pain and suffering related to the pregnancy, birth, per-
sonal injury and child-rearing expenses. 199
The Johnson court, after exploring the approaches used by other
states, did not find it persuasive to award child-rearing expenses be-
cause such costs are too speculative and it would be almost impossible
" See id.
im See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983)Johnson v. University flusps.,
540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989).
1 ° 1 SeeJohnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1375.
102 See Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 862-63; Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
103 See Johnson, 540 N.E..2d at 1376.
104 See id. in 1376 (citing Byrd, 699 P.2d at 466-67).
1 °5 See Lucklar, supra note 28, at 165.
14)6 SeeJohnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
1 ° 7 See id. at 1370.
1 °8 See id. at 1370-71.
109 See id. at 1371.
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for a jury to place a price tag on the life of a child. 110 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that Ohio's public policy dictated that the birth of
a healthy child can not be an injury to its parents.'" The court rea-
soned that only the Ohio legislature, by balancing competing social
philosophies, could decide whether child-rearing expenses could be
recognizable damages.'" The Johnson court, however, stated that other
damages such as medical expenses, loss of consortium, emotional dis-
tress, loss of wages, and pain and suffering are appropriate." 5
 Accord-
big to the court, such damages should he allowed because in a negli-
gence analysis the doctor owed a duty to the patient and such duty
was breached.'"
3. Full Recovery
The third approach to awarding damages in wrongful conception
cases is full recovery."5 The jurisdictions applying this view allow re-
covery for all damages that are incident to the pregnancy including
child-rearing expenses."6 Some of these courts have reasoned that it
would not he speculative to award these costs because juries are accus-
tomed to calculating these costs in other types of tort actions.'" Ac-
cording to these courts, public policy considerations do not preclude
the recovery of child-rearing and education expenses because even
the birth of a healthy child imposes certain costs on parents—costs
they had sought to avoid."8 Furthermore, some courts have stated
that public policy compels recovery of child-rearing damages in order
to protect the right to family planning."°
In 1990, for example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Mar-
ti niak v. Lundborg, held that the parents of a healthy child may recover
damages, including child-rearing expenses, from a physician who neg-
ligently performed a sterilization procedure."° The court found that
these costs should not be offset by the benefits conferred upon the
ID See id. 511378.
"' See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
112 see id,
113
 See id. at 137811.8.
114 See id. am 1378.
115 See Marciniak v. Ltindborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Wis. 1990).
116 See id.
117 See Mareiniak, 450 N.W.2d at 245.
118 See id. at 249.
In See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 003, 612-13 (N.M. 1991).
120 Mareiniak, 950 N.W.2d at 245.
May 2000]	 Motivatii;nal Analysis in Wrongful Conception Cases 	 597
parents by the presence of a healthy child in their lives.121 In Mar-
cinialt, a woman sought a sterilization procedure to avoid having more
children. 122 At the time, she already had two young children and was
working twenty-five hours a week. 1 " She underwent a laparascopy
with bilateral fallopian tube cautery and was under the impression
that this procedure would result in permanent sterilization. 124 Despite
the surgery, she became pregnant and delivered a child. 125
In finding the physician negligent, the Marciniak court explained
that no public policy considerations prevented the recognition of li-
ability)" The court stated that traditional principles of tort liability
should apply and a wrongdoer must compensate those who are in-
jured by his or her negligence. 127 According to the court, child-
rearing costs are not speculative because similar types of costs are
awarded in numerous other types of cases such as wrongful death
cases. 128 Moreover, these damages are not out of proportion to the
doctor's .culpability because they are foreseeable. 129 Additionally, pub-
lic policy does not immunize defendants from liability merely because
the damages are substantial)" The court also reasoned that awarding
child-rearing damages to the parents would not psychologically dam-
age the child, but rather it would alleviate the family's economic bur-
dens and add to the well-being of the child. 131 Finally, the Marcinialt
court reasoned that it would not be equitable to force upon the par-
ents the costs of raising a child when they sought precisely to avoid
those costs. 132 The court, therefore, found that the costs of raising a
child until the age of majority may not be offset by the benefit of hav-
ing a healthy child in their lives since such benefit was not sought)"
121 see id.
122 See id. at 244.
123 See id.
121 See id.
125 See Marciniak. 450 N.W.2d at 244.
126 See id. at 248.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 245-4G.
129 See id. at 24G.
130 See Mareinials, 450 N.W.2d. at 246.
131 See id. in 246.
192 See id. at 249.
139 see id.
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4. The Offset Benefits View
The fourth approach to damages in wrongful conception cases is
referred to as the offset benefits view." 4 Courts using this method re-
ject the view that, as a matter of law, child-rearing expenses are not
recoverable."' These courts, however, do not go as far as full recovery
because they hold that the child-rearing damages should be offset by
the benefit the parents receive from having a healthy child." 6
 These
courts draw this principle from Section 920 of the Restatement (Second)
of Tarts which states that when a defendant's tortious act causes harm
to the plaintiff but also confers a benefit, such benefit should be con-
sidered in mitigation of damages to the extent it is equitable.'" Juris-
dictions using this approach allow the jury to decide when child-
rearing costs exceed the benefits, and allow plaintiffs to recover the
difference between the costs and the benefit. 138
 Some courts have
refined this process and take into account the plaintiff's motivation
for seeking the sterilization procedure." 9 Those courts which take the
parents' motivation into account are more likely to allow recovery for
the costs of child-rearing if the primary motivation was financia1. 140 If
the parents seek sterilization, however, for eugenic reasons (e.g.
avoidance of a genetic defect), or out of concern for the mother's
health, then recovery for these costs is less justified."'
In 1983, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in University of Arizona.
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, adopted the offset benefits view
and held that the benefits of an unplanned but healthy child may be
weighed against any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in deter-
mining plaintiffs' recovery in a wrongful conception case. 142
 The Uni-
versity of Arizona. court found that a health care provider operating a
teaching hospital could be liable for negligently performing a vasec-
tomy."' The plaintiffs were a husband and wife, who after having
three children, decided not to have any more children.'" The hus-
1 m See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ci., 667 P.2d 1294, 1297
(Ariz. 1983).
133 See id. at 1299.
" See id. at 1301.
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
" See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr, 667 P.2(1 at 1294.
139 See Burke v. Rive, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990).
I'1° See id.
141
 See ift. at 5.
142 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cl,:, 667 P.2(1 at 1299, 1301.
143 See id. at 1296.
144 See id.
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band and wife decided that a vasectomy was the best means of contra-
ception for them. 145 After the husband underwent the vasectomy op-
eration, the wife became pregnant and delivered a healthy child. 146
Subsequently, the husband and wife sued the doctor and his em-
ployer, the teaching hospital, seeking damages including child-rearing
expenses. 147
The University of Arizona court, after discussing the approaches
taken by courts throughout the country, reasoned that child-rearing
damages are compensable but should he offset by the benefits of the
parent-child relationship.'" The court recognized that the birth of a
healthy child is not always a benefit, depending on the reasons behind
the parents' decision not to have another child. 149 Although in some
cases a family can adjust to the birth of a child they were not expect-
ing, hi other cases the birth of an unplanned child can cause serious
emotional and economic problems to the parents)" Further, con-
trary to what other courts claim, child-rearing damages are not specu-
lative because such calculations are routinely performed in other
types of cases. 151
The court reasoned that the costs of child-rearing should be off-
set by the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits conferred on the
parents according to the particular circumstances of the case. 152 For
example, the court suggested that factors such as family size, family
income, age of the parents and .marital status be taken into account
when calculating the benefit to the parents.'" According to the court,
the offset benefits approach allows the jury certain flexibility in de-
termining which persons have suffered more or gained more as a re-
sult of the birth of a healthy child. 154 The court reasoned that the jury
represents a cross-section of the community and as such can better
reach a consensus as to whether damages are warranted in the case
before them. 155 The court explained that if compensation for child-
rearing damages were based on an "iron-clad" rule, judges would im-
See id.
146 See id.
147 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences CtE, 6671'.24 at 1296.
118 Sec id. at 1299.
149 See id. at 1300.
150 See id. :u 1299.
151 See id. at 1297-1208.
152 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Gin, 007 1'.24 at 1299.
153 See id. at 1300 (citation omitted).
154 See id. at 1301.
155 See id. at 1299-1300.
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pose their personal views on morality by deciding cases based on per-
sonal emotion. 156
 The court also reasoned that denying compensation
for child-rearing expenses would deviate from one of the basic princi-
ples of tort law—that a wrongdoer is held liable for all damages which
he caused and all costs which the victim sustains as a result of the
wrong. 157
 Therefore, the court determined that this case-by-case adju-
dication in determining child-rearing damages, despite its inevitable
variations, provides the most accurate method in computing damages
in wrongful conception cases. 158
II. ENDORSEMENT AND CRITICISMS OF THE OFFSET BENEFITS VIEW
A. Endorsements of Offset Benefits View
The offset benefits view presents the most problematic applica-
tion of all damage rules used by courts in wrongful conception
cases.'" Sonic commentators have regarded the offset benefits ap-
proach to wrongful conception damages as a sensible or enlightened
solution. 16° Other commentators consider it merely as a step in the
right direction. 10 The debate, however, has centered on criticizing
the approach as a whole or on criticizing specific cases applying the
offsets benefits view. 162 This Note seeks to show that despite all of the
shortcomings discussed in the current literature, the most critical flaw
of the application of the offset benefits rule to wrongful conception
cases is the use of the motivational analysis. This section will review
the current debate surrounding the application of the offset benefits
rule in wrongful conception cases.
156
 See id. at 1298, 1300.
157 See id. at 1300.
158 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cir., 667 P.2d. at 1301.
159 SeePodcwils, supra note 3, at 419-20, 421.
16° Sederrain, supra note 79, at 1665; Michael C. Pallesen, Note, Wrondirl Pregnancy Ac-
lions: Should Courts Allow Recovery for Childrearing Expenses ?—Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764,
551 N.E.2d 1 (1990), 70 NEB. L. Ray. 361, 379 (1991).
161
 See O'Shea, supra note 80, at 988-89 (suggesting that a more equitable approach
within this framework would be to focus on the reasons for the parents' reliance on the
surgical procedure); Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 828 (arguing that the offset benefits ap-
proach is a step in the right direction but that the court should have allowed full recov-
ery).
162 But see Jeff L. Milsteen, Comment, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth
Cases: A Motivational Analysis, 32 EMORY L.J. 1167 (1983). Although the Milsteen article is
the only journal article dealing exclusively with the motivational framework, it generally
deals with wrongful birth actions and not specifically with wrongful conception actions. See
id.
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The jurisdictions that have adopted the offset benefits rule view it
as a course of greater justice, at least, when compared to the alterna-
tive of denying all recovery. 163 These courts find that the policy rea-
sons typically advanced to prevent the recovery of child-rearing ex-
penses do not always outweigh the injury suffered by the parents. 164
According to these courts, the offset benefits approach allows the fact-
finder to weigh all of the circumstances in each case before coming
up with a damages award. 165 Only in that way, can the result in each
case be the most accurate and efficient in promoting the goals of tort
law. 166
Jurisdictions following the offset benefits rule recognize that
there are situations where parents, despite the benefits they might
receive from the birth of a child, are simply tillable to provide for an-
other child, either financially or emotionally or both. 167 Thus, an in-
jury requiring compensation has indeed occurred as a result of the
physician's negligence. 168 These courts do not find the recognition of
the existence of an injury as inconsistent with public policy because
163 Seejones v. Malittowski, 473 A.2d 429, 434 (Md. 1984) (quoting Ilartke v. 114cKel•ay,
707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
164 See Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (Conn. 1982); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d
511, 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). The Troppi court describes a situation where an unwed
college SURImil becomes pregnant due to a pharmacist's failure to properly fill her pre-
scription for birth control pills. See id, at 518. According to the court, she will suffer far
greater damage than the young newlywed who was only using contraceptives temporarily
while she and her husband were taking an exiendcd honeymoon trip. See id. at 518-19.
165 See noppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518. In 1992, anodic' . panel of the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals in deciding a wrongful conception case declined to follow the "benefits rule" set out
in Troppi. See Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). In Rouse, the
Michigan Court of Appeals stated that the portion of the holding in Troppi relying on the
benefits rule was undermined, yet the cowl did not overrule nopi. See id. at 12 11.3. Iii
1999, another panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals abolished the tort of wrongful birth
until the Michigan Snpreme Court or the Michigan legislature provided further guidance.
SeeTaylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). The Michigan Court of
Appeals, in Taylor, criticized the benefits rule not only in wrongful birth cases but in
wrongful conception cases. See id. at 678-681. The Taylor court was very critical of noppi's
benefits rule and explicitly overruled the application of noppi in wrongful birth cases. See
id. at 688-91. As to wrongful conception cases, the 'Traylor court assumed claims would be
limited by Rouse until the Supreme Court of Michigan or the legislature provides further
guidance. See id. at 681 n.35. The Taylor court did not address to what extent wrongful con-
ception claims remain tenable in Michigan because the case before them was a wrongful
birth case. See id.
166 See University of Arizona Health Sciences Cm v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294,
1301 (Ariz. 1983); Jones, 473 A.2d at 438; Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990).
167 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences On, 667 l'.2d at 1298; Jones, 473 A.2d at 435-36;
Burke. 551 N.E.2d at 4.
168 See]onrs, 473 A.2d at 435-36.
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"parental pleasures do not eradicate the economic reality." 169 More
importantly, as is sometimes suggested by other jurisdictions, these
courts do not consider the child as the injury. 170
 Instead, similar to
jurisdictions allowing full recovery, these courts are willing to award
child-rearing expenses because they consider the cost of raising a
child as the direct and foreseeable consequence of a physician's neg-
ligence."' Since tort law principles dictate that a wrongdoer must be
held liable for all damages caused as a result of his or her wrong, it
would be against legal principles and public policy to let parents go
uncompensated for their injury. 172
-	 The offset benefits view, however, differs from the full recovery
view in that the recovery of such foreseeable and direct damages can
be offset by the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits conferred on
the parents by the birth of a healthy child. 173 These jurisdictions find
the offset benefits rule desirable because it allows more flexibility by
tailoring the damages award to the circumstances of each case rather
than subscribing to a strict recovery rule for all cases. 174
 To these
courts, this flexibility is important in providing a more accurate as-
sessment of the damages in each case. 175 Moreover, these jurisdictions
consider it unfair and dangerous to provide full compensation in all
cases for the birth of a healthy baby because the benefits and injuries
to the parents vary with the circumstances. 176
169 Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885.
17° See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 1?2d 603,609-11 (N.M. 1991). The court in
Lovelace applied the offset benefits rule to the emotional distress claim and not to the
child-rearing expenses claim. See id. at 613-14.
171 See Jones, 473 A.2d at 435; Bathe, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
172 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ger, 667 P.2d at 1300; Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885 (not-
ing that to limit recovery for child-rearing expenses would be tantamount to carving out
an exception to traditional tort principles based on public policy and such policy reasons
cannot support such an exception because it would impair the exercise of a constitution-
ally protected right to use contraceptive measures to limit. their family size); Troppi, 187
N.W.2d at 513.
171 Seejones, 473 A.2d at 437; Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5; noppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518-19.
174 See, e.g., Doppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518-19 (stating that the trier of fact must look at fac-
tors such as family size, family income, age of the parents and marital status in determin-
ing the extent to which the birth of a child represents a benefit to his parents).
175 See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Or, 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 437
(claiming the offset benefits rule reduces speculation).
176 See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cu;,/ 667 P.2d at 1299-1300; formes, 473 A.2d
at 437; Bathe, 551 N.E.2d at 5-6 (noting that when parents undergo a sterilization to avoid
transmitting a genetic defect and a healthy child is horn to them, the child provides more
benefit to the parents than when the parents do so to conserve family resources).
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An important component of the formula used by jurisdictions
applying the offset benefits rule in calculating the benefits conferred
in each case is the parents' motivation for seeking sterilization. 177
These courts reason that by looking at the motivation of the parents,
the offset benefits view constitutes a better approach because it makes
it easier to determine when a real injury exists and thus, separates the
meritorious from frivolous claims. 118 Offset benefits jurisdictions, al-
though in varying degrees, focus on the parents' motivation because,
depending on those reasons, the parents might be injured or
benefited. 179 For instance, some of these courts suggest that if a par-
ent was sterilized in order to avoid the danger of a genetic defect, the
birth of a healthy child would be a blessing and the jury could find
that the parents were not injured.180 Despite this strong suggestion,
most jurisdictions applying the offset benefits rule do not specifically
mention in their opinions which motivations were considered more
likely to trigger compensation. 181 These courts favor a totality of cir-
cumstances approach, where motivation is one of many factors to be
considered by the trier of fact. 182 According to these courts, this ap-
proach strives for justice in all cases rather than a strict rule which
produces just results in some cases and injust results in others, 183
Another reason advanced by the jurisdictions applying the offset
benefits rule is that the courts' role in the judicial system is to exam-
ine problems logically and apply the relevant legal principles, not to
impose the judges' view of morality. 184 These courts reason that creat-
ing a strict rule denying or allowing full recovery in wrongful concep-
tion cases is tantamount to forcing on society an individual judge's
private view on the value of human life. 185 Furthermore, it would take
away from the jury their role in considering the basic values of human
177
 See infra notes 222-326 and accompanying text.
178 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cif, 667 1'.2d at 1300 (responding to the criti-
cism that the offset benefits view will permit damages where no real injury exists): Jones,
473 A.2d at 434.
179 See University of An'z. Health Sciences Cir., 667 1'.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436;
Buda., 551 N.E.2d at 5.
18° See University of Ariz, Health Sciences Ctc, 667 P.2d at 1300.
181 See Jones, 473 A.2d at 437.
152 see rd.
183 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cti:, 667 P.2d at 1298; Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518—
19.
184 See University of Adz. Health Sciences Ctr., 667 I'.2d at 1298-99; Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at
515 (emphasizing that the resolution of the case requires no intrusion into the domain of
moral philosophy, it only requires the application of led col lllll on law principles).
185
 She University' of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr, 667 P.2d at 1299.
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life inherent in each situation. 186
 According to these courts, it is of
utmost importance that juries, not judges, consider these basic hu-
man values in calculating damages awards in wrongful conception
cases because they represent a cross-section of the community and
better reflect society's ethical views. 187
B. Criticisms of the Offset Benefits View
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States, however, do
not agree with the offset benefits approach."8 The biggest criticism
stems from the application of the benefit rule as stated in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts) 89 Judges and commentators advocating the lim-
ited recovery view argue that the benefits of having a child always
outweigh the cost of raising them. 193 Thus, according to them, the
correct application of the benefit rule would preclude compensation
for child-rearing expenses."'
Full recovery jurisdictions, however, have interpreted the benefit
rule differently. 192
 Their criticism of the offset benefits approach fo-
cuses on the "same interest limitation" of section 920, comment b of
the Restatement (Second) of Tods. 193 This limitation requires that benefits
of a particular interest be used to offset interest of the same kind. 194
In wrongful conception cases, the same interest limitation would
mean using the non-pecuniary benefits conferred on the parents by
the birth of the healthy child to offset the non-pecuniary damages
ta° See id.
187 See
188 See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
189 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 920 (1977). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts §920 provides "kid hen a defendant's tuitions conduct has caused harm to the plain-
tiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that it is equitable." Id.
' 9° Seejohnson v. University Flosps., 540 N.E.2d 1370,1373-74,1378 (Ohio 1989). The
Johnson court stated "Ulf the concept of benefit or offset were applied to actions for
wrongful pregnancy, ... benefits could be greater than damages, in which event someone
could argue that the parents would owe something to the tortfeasors [A] child should
not be viewed as a piece of property." Id. at 1374 (citations omitted); see University of Ariz.
Health Sciences Or, 667 P.2d at 1301 (Gordon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Or., 667 P.2d at 1301 (C1°111014, concurring in
part and dissen ting in part).
195 See supra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §920 cmt. b (1977). The Restatement (Second)
of Torts provides that Id]amages resulting from an invasion of one interest are not dimin-
ished by showing that another interest has benefited." Id.
19-1 See id.
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and the pecuniary benefits to offset the pecuniary damages. 195 There-
fore, the emotional benefits conferred on the parents should not be
used to decrease the compensation for child-rearing expenses be-
cause these are two different interests: 1 °6
These critics argue that most jurisdictions applying the offset
benefits rule interpret this benefit rule too broadly and thus, un-
justifiably reduce damages. 197 Some proponents of the offset benefits
approach do not find these arguments persuasive because to them,
the economic burdens and emotional distress of raising an unplanned
child are inextricably related and are basically the same interest.'"
Other offset benefits supporters reason that since the rule is based on
the notion of unjust enrichment, to strictly interpret the same interest
limitation would allow unjust enrichment to occur in many cases. 1"
Other arguments set forth by the critics of the offset benefits ap-
proach involve their assessment of public policy 200 They reason that
because the most important function of an appellate court is to guide
the common law according to public policy, courts should be ex-
tremely careful in calculating the damages in wrongful conception
cases."' Since there are many differences in opinion and values in-
volved in wrongful conception cases, judges must tread cautiously,
keeping the goals of the legal system and justice foremost in their
minds. 202 According to these critics, the offset benefits approach vio-
lates public policy in multiple ways. 203 For example, these critics argue
that it is impossible for a jury to place a price tag on the beneficial
value of a child to his or her parents. 204 As the court in Johnson stated,
we are not in the business of placing value on a smile or quantifying
the negative impact of a temper tantrum. We cannot pretend to know
195 See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d al 1374; Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248-49
(Wis. 1990).
196 SeeJohnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1374; Marcinialt, 450 N.W.2d at 248-49.
197 See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1374; Marcinialt, 450 N.W.2d at 248-49; Garfinkle, supra
note 4, at 827; Pallesen, supra note 162, at 370-71.
I99 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ch:, 667 P.2d at 1300 11.4; Trop/ 1, 187 N.W.2d at
518 (noting that since pregnancy and its attendant anxiety arc inextricably related to child
bearing, it would not be sound to separate those segments of damage from the economic
costs of raising an unplanned child).
199 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ch:, 667 1'.2d at 130011.4.
200 Sec infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
201 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctc, 667 P.2(1 at 1301 (Gordon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
202 see id.
See a at 1302.
204 SeeJohnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378.
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what the future may hold—and neither can or may a jury! " 205 Another
danger perceived by these critics is that the application of the benefit
rule invites a trial over the emotional and psychological benefits and
detriments received by the parents. 206 This could result in the "un-
seemly spectacle of the parents' attempting to show how slight or non-
existent was the psychological benefit derived from the child in order
to minimize the offset to their non-pecuniary benefits."207 As to the
meaning of the judgment itself, the critics argue that a judgment for
the parents under the offset benefits approach suggests that the child
is not worth the effort to raise him or her. 208 Such result offends no-
tions of public policy. 202
The critics of the offset benefits approach also see analytical flaws
in the way courts apply the benefits rule.") Critics find that offset
benefits jurisdictions are disingenuous because even though they
claim their approach is better—in that they are the ones who least
deviate from traditional tort law principles—they fail to apply other
tort principles such as a duty to mitigate damages."' Other analytical
flaws are seen in the actual calculation of the cost-benefit analysis. 212
As one commentator has suggested, the benefits approach ignores the
fact that the parents in a wrongful conception case already have done
this cost-benefit analysis and for that reason—that the benefits did not
outweigh the burdens—sought sterilization. 213
It is difficult to ascertain the real impact of all these criticisms
because juries usually do not itemize their damage awards and it is
nearly impossible to figure out how they arrived at their calculation in
2°5 Id.
206 See Lovelace Med. On, 805 P.2d at 613-14.
"7 Id.
2132 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctrs, 667 P.2d at 1302 (Gordon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Nev. 1986).
203 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 7 (O'Connor, ,l., dissenting).
210 See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 826-27.
211 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences CU, 667 P.2d w 1303 (Gordon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that in the usual lawsuit if a plaintiff has failed to miti-
gate his or her damages, this fact is allowed as an offset against recovery). For information
on the mitigation of damages in wrongfid conception cases, see Norman EL Block, Wrong-
ful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDIIAM L. REV.
1107 (1985).
212 See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 826.
213 See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 826; see also Marciniak, 459 N.W.2d at 249 (rejecting
the offset benefits view).
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offsetting the bnrcleris and benefits. 214 There is no reliable data to
analyze the practical application of the offset benefits approach. Nev-
ertheless, one important flaw that is often overlooked in analyzing the
offset benefits approach has to do with the motivational analysis used
by those jurisdictions. By giving weight to the reasons why the parents
sought sterilization, the courts are implying that a person's right to
contraception is legitimate only for certain reasons. 215 Furthermore,
courts that consider motivation deny recovery to a certain group of
parents, who despite being injured by a physician's negligence, sought
sterilization for non-financial reasons. 216
III. DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS OF THE MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS IN
OFFSET BENEFITS JURISDICTIONS
Jurisdictions following the offset benefits rule have not applied
the motivational analysis uniformly in determining child-rearing
damages. 217 Some jurisdictions consider the parents' motivation for
seeking sterilization to be determinative of the outcome. 21° Other ju-
risdictions consider motivation as a factor to be considered by the jury
when calculating child-rearing damages. 21° Only one court using the
offset benefits approach has rejected the use of a motivational analysis
in calculating child-rearing damages. 22° That court, however, used the
offset benefits analysis only for the claims dealing with emotional dis-
tress and pain and suffering, not child-rearing damages. 221
A. Motivation as a Determinant—The Massachusetts Approach
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court first recognized a
cause of action for wrongful conception in 1990. 222 Currently, Massa-
chusetts is one of various jurisdictions espousing the offset benefits
view when awarding compensation for child-rearing expenses. 223 The
214 See, e.g. Jones, 473 A.2d at 431 (noting that it cannot be ascertained from the jury's
award of $70,000 whether it included any money for child rearing costs or if the jury took
into account the benefits conferred on the parents by the child).
215 See Lovelace Med. Ctc, 805 P.2d at 611.
216 See infra notes 222-50 and accompanying text.
217 See infra notes 222-326 Mid accompanying text.
2L8 See Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1.2 (Mass. 1990).
2 L 2 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cir. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1300
(Ariz. 1983).
220 See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991).
221 See id. at 613-14.
222 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 2.
WI See id. at 6.
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Massachusetts approach, however, differs from that of the other offset
benefits jurisdictions because the parents' motivation for seeking the
sterilization determines the outcome. 224
It was not until 1990, in Burke v. Rivo, that the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court directly addressed a claim for wrongful concep-
tion.225 In Burke, the court held that the parents of a healthy baby
born after an unsuccessful sterilization procedure could recover dam-
ages for raising the child. to adulthood. 226 The Burke court, however,
held that such damages should be offset by the benefits conferred on
the parents by the birth of the child. 227 The mother in Burke met with
her physician to discuss her desire not to have any more children. 228
She wanted to return to work, after having three children, because
her family was experiencing financial difficulties. 229 Her doctor sug-
gested that she submit to a tubal ligation. 250 Almost a year and a half
after the tubal ligation, she became pregnant and gave birth to a
healthy baby.251 The question before the court dealt only with dam-
ages because the trial judge concluded that a doctor may properly be
held liable if his performance of a sterilization procedure permits
conception. 232
The court relied on the case law of other jurisdictions to con-
clude that parents of a healthy child born as a result of a doctor's neg-
ligence could recover damages directly associated with the birth, in-
cluding emotional distress. 233 The recovery of such damages was,
according to the court, supported by the fact that almost every juris-
diction in the United States permits these damages. 234 The court held,
however, that compensation for child-rearing expenses is allowed only
when the parents' motivation for seeking sterilization is financial. 235
The court reasoned that under normal tort and contract principles,
child-rearing costs are reasonably foreseeable and are a natural con-
sequence of the defendant's negligence. 236 The court determined that
221 See id. at 5-6.
225 See generally id. at 1-8.
228 See id. at 6.
227
 See Buda', 551 N.E.2d at 6.
228 See id. at 2.
228 See id.
238 See id.
231 See id.
232 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 2.
233 See id. at 3.
234
 See id.
235 See id. at 5.
238 See id. at 4.
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the plaintiffs should recover child-rearing costs without regard to pub-
lic policy reasons (such as the psychological effect on the child when
she finds out she was unwanted) or that child-rearing damages are too
speculative.237 The court, however, implied that public policy consid-
erations would limit the recovery of child- rearing expenses when the
motivations behind the sterilization are non-financia1. 238 According to
the court, the birth of a child is not always a net benefit; this is par-
ticularly true when parents undergo a sterilization procedure because
they can not afford to raise another child. 239 On the other hand, when
the reasons behind sterilization are eugenic (to avoid a genetic de-
fect) or therapeutic (to protect the mother's health), the court ex-
plained that the birth of a healthy infant is a net benefit because the
child was not expected to he healthy. 240
The Burke dissent advocated the limited recovery rule where
plaintiffs may recover immediate costs but not child-rearing ex-
penses."' The dissenting justices reasoned that it would be improper
to allow recovery for child-rearing damages because a medical mal-
practice action for wrongful conception involves the creation of hu-
man life and is thus very different from most medical malpractice ac-
tions.242 According to • the dissent, awarding child-rearing damages
leads to improper inquiries into the value of a child to his or her par-
ents. 245 Furthermore, the policy of Massachusetts is to strengthen and
encourage family life for the protection of children. 244
 The dissenting
justices argued that the majority's holding contradicted such public
policy.20 They also criticized the majority's assumption that parents
elected sterilization for one of three reasons: (1) economic; (2)
eugenic; or (3) therapeutic. 2 '16 The dissent noted that parents may
desire sterilization for a combination of reasons not discussed by the
majority. 247
In Massachusetts, the parents' motivation for seeking sterilization
determines whether the parents will be compensated for child-rearing
2R7 See Burlee, 551 N.E.2d at 4-5.
228 See id. at 5-6.
239 See id.
249 sec id.
2" See id. at 6 (O'Connord., dissenting).
242 See. Rorke, 552 N.E.2d at 6 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212 See id. at 7 .
211 See id.
245 See Id.
246 See id. at 7 n.l.
247 See &the, 551 N.E.2d at 711.1 (O'Connor, J„ dissenting).
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expenses. 248
 If parents seek sterilization for financial reasons, they will
be able to recover child-rearing expenses, subject to an offset benefit
analysis. 249
 On the other hand, if the parents' reasons for undergoing
sterilization are not related to financial considerations, they may not
recover child-rearing expenses. 250
B. Motivation Is an Implied Consideration in the Decision—The Connecticut
Approach
Other jurisdictions have used motivation as an implied factor in
deciding whether child-rearing damages are appropriate. 251 For ex-
ample, in 1982, the Supreme Court of Comiecticut, in Ochs v. Borrelli,
held that the parents of a child conceived after an unsuccessful sterili-
zation procedure may recover child-rearing expenses offset by the
benefits conferred on them by the child. 252
 In Oda, a mother of two
submitted to a tubal ligation and over a year later, she gave birth to a
child. 255 She and her husband sought damages from their doctor for
the immediate medical expenses relating to the sterilization and the
pregnancy, as well as for the pain and suffering associated with the
unplanned pregnancy. 254
 In addition, she sought compensation for
the costs relating to raising her child until the age of majority. 255 The
trial court instructed the jury to compensate her for all such damages
including child-rearing expenses if they found the doctor negligent. 256
248 See id. at 6.
249
 See id.
23* See id. at 5-6.
231 See OCI1S v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883,884 (Conn. 1982).
252 See id. at 885. In Ochs, the child was born with orthopedic defects unlike children in
other wrongful conception cases who arc healthy. See id. at 884.
253 See id. at 883-84.
234 See id. at 884.
255 See id.
256 See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 884,1.3. The trial judge instructed:
Where die negligence of the defendant is proven, the law allows plaintiff to .
reeover for the past and anticipated expenses of rearing the unplanned-for
child, the rationale being that the new arrival should not deprive the other
members of the family of what was planned as their just share of the family
income .... n considering this claim of damages, any child-rearing ex-
penses must be reduced by the value of the benefits conferred on the parents
by having an raising the child. Such benefits may be the satisfaction, the fun,
the joy, the companionship, and the like, which the plaintiffs as parents have
had and will have in the rearing of the child and which make economic ex-
penses worthwhile.
Id.
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The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs awarding damages for medi-
cal expenses, pain and suffering and child-rearing expenses. 257 On
appeal, the doctor admitted to negligence but appealed the award of
child-rearing expenses on policy grounds. 258 The doctor argued that
public policy considerations dictate that the birth of a child is always a
blessing and that this benefit, as: a matter of law, offsets any financial
burdens the parents Might experience. 259
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the jury's verdict. 260
The Ochs court reasoned that it does not contradict public policy to
allow financial compensation for the birth of an unplanned child. 261
According to the Ochs court, recognizing that there are substantial
costs involved in raising a child does not refute the notion that there
are also joys involved.262 As such, some compensation for child-rearing
expenses is necessary because the parental pleasures do not eradicate
the economic reality of the parents. 265 The court also reasoned that a
per se rule dictating that costs always outweigh the benefits would not
be desirable because such determination would vary depending on
the facts of each case. 264 The court thought that using the offset
benefits approach would permit a more effective and equitable case-
by-case determination. 265 The Ochs court did not consider the weigh-
ing of non-economic factors against the monetary damages as
impermissibly speculative because such computations and value
judgments also are made in other tort cases, such as wrongful
death. 266 Therefore, the court applied the same interest limitation of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts broadly by allowing lion-pecuniary in-
terests to offset the economic injury suffered by the parents. 267
Although the Ochs court did not expressly indicate in its opinion
whether the parents' motivation for seeking sterilization should be
considered when awarding child-rearing expenses, it implied that it
could be a consideration in determining whether the birth of the
257 See id. at 884.
258
 See id.
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885.
262 See id.
263 See id. at 885-86.
261 See id. at 886.
265 See id.
266 See Ochs, 495 A.2d at 885-86.
267 See id. at 884 n.3,886 (stating that the total costs of child rearing were not imposed
on the physician because the non-pecuniary benefits of the satisfaction, fitn and compan-
ionship of raising the child were used to offset the economic costs of child- rearing).
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child was a net benefit. 268 The Ochs court paid a lot of attention to the
mother's considerations for undergoing a tubal ligation. 269
 The
mother in Ochs had two other children who were born with mild or-
thopedic defects and she had a history of miscarriage and ovarian
surgery.2" The court did not make an issue of the fact that the new-
born child was not perfectly healthy because the doctor accepted re-
sponsibility for paying for the child's orthopedic expenses. 271 The
court therefore considered that the mother, knowing about her fam-
ily's genetic history and her own health problems, had sought to avoid
having more children by becoming sterilized. 272 The Ochs court did
not object to the consideration of these facts by the jury. 2" Thus, the
parents' motivation was an implied factor used by the jury in awarding
child-rearing expenses. 274
C. Motivation Is an Expressed Factor—The Maryland Approach
Maryland is one of at least two jurisdictions using motivation as a
factor in the consideration of child-rearing damages. 275 In 1984, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Jones v. Malinowski, used the offset
benefits theory when it decided that a jury could award damages for
child-rearing expenses reduced by the value of the benefits conferred
upon the parents by the birth of the child. 276 Jones dealt with a cou-
ple's suit against their physician for negligently performing a tubal
laparoscopy which resulted in the birth of a healthy child. 277 The par-
ents wanted to avoid conceiving more children because they had lim-
ited financial means and their three other children suffered from
various diseases. 278 Furthermore, all of Mrs. Malinowski's pregnancies
and deliveries had been traumatic experiences. 279 Her first pregnancy
resulted in a breech birth, her second child was horn with a brain dis-
269 See id. at 885-86.
269 See id. at 883-84.
270 See
27 L See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 884 11.2.
272 See id. at 883-84.
273 See id,
274
 See id. at 883-84.
275 See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429,437 (Md. 1984).
276 See id.
277 See id. at 430.
278 See id. In Jones, the plaintiff had one child with a brain disease and another with
heart disease. See id.
279 See id.
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ease and her third child nearly died at birth and suffered from heart
problems. 28°
In Jones, the trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider
child-rearing expenses as an element of damages because "persons
have the right to limit the size of their family for whatever reason, be
it for health or socio-economic reasons."281 The trial judge also in-
structed the jury to consider the *value conferred upon [the parents]
in having a healthy child, such as the child's aid, comfort and society
during the parents' life expectancy. ''282 The jury, in finding the doctor
negligent, awarded the parents $70,000 in total damages. 288 The jury's
verdict, however, does not itemize the amounts for each type of dam-
ages claim it awards. 284 Thus, it is impossible to determine if any of it
included child-rearing costs and if it did, whether any benefits were
taken into account. 285
The Jones court, in upholding the jury's verdict and the trial
judge's damages theory, found that a plaintiff in Maryland may re-
cover for all the natural, direct and proximate consequences of the
tortious act. 286 In addition, the court found that the benefits rule also
had been applied in other civil actions in Maryland. 287 Thus, the court
reasoned that parents should be able to recover for the consequences
of the negligent sterilization, including child-rearing expenses, be-
cause to preclude such recovery would be at odds with traditional tort
doctrine. 288 These costs, however, should be offset by the benefits con-
ferred on the parents in order to permit the verdict to be based upon
the facts of the specific case eliminating speculative damages.289
The Jones court used the motivational analysis as a means of de-
termining if there was any injury to the parents. 290 The court rea-
soned that an appropriate assessment of damages can be made by fo-
cusing on the reasons the parents sought sterilization.m If the
physician's negligence impaired the interest the parents sought to
28° See Jones, 473 A.2c1 at 430.
281 See id. at 431.
282 Id,
283 See hi.
284 Sec id,
285 See Jones, 473 A.2d at 431.
296
 See id. at 935.
287 See id. (citing Levi v. Schwartz, 95 A.2d 322 (1953)).
289 See hi. at 435.
289 See id. at 437.
29° See Jones, 473 A.2d at 436.
291 See id.
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protect by the sterilization, then child-rearing damages can be coin-
pensable.292 In this way, the Jones court made motivation a factor to be
taken into account when awarding child-rearing damages. 293 The Jones
court, however, did not make motivation a determinative factor be-
cause persons have the right to limit the size of their family for what-
ever reason S. 294
D. Motivation is Not a Factor—The New Mexico Approach
One jurisdiction has expressly rejected the use of motivation as a
consideration for determining compensation for child-rearing ex-
penses. 298 In 1991, the Supreme Court of New 'Mexico, in Lovelace
Medical Center v. Mendez, held that the parents of a normal, healthy
child conceived as a result of a negligently performed sterilization
procedure can recover the costs of raising the child from birth to
adulthood.296 The Lovelace court, howeyer, held that damages for emo-
tional distress in this type of action were not compensable. 297 In Love-
lace, a mother, after having two children, decided to undergo a tubal
ligation in order to limit the size of her family. 298 The mother and her
husband could not afford to raise another child. 299 The doctor who
performed the procedure, an employee of Lovelace Medical Center,
only ligated one of the mother's fallopian tubes." Moreover, the doc-
tor failed to inform her that only one of her tubes had been ligated
and that therefore, she was not sterile and must continue to use birth
control measures. 3°1 Because the mother was unaware of her contin-
ued fertility, she took no precautions and became pregnant." She
gave birth to a healthy child and instituted the malpractice action
against the hospital."
The Lovelace court reasoned that the parents had suffered inju-
ries for which they must be compensated. 804 According to the court,
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 43711.5.
295 See Lovelace Med. Cti:, 805 P.2d at 612.
296 See id. at 612.
297 See id. at 614,
298 See id. at app. 615.
299
 See id,
390 See Lovelace Med. Cir., 805 P.2d at app. 615.
591 See ht.
302 See id.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 609.
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the injury was not, as some 'other courts have characterized it, the
wrongful act of the doctor or the birth of the child." 5 Instead, the
parents were injured by the invasion of their interest to their family's
financial stability and the invasion to their interest in family plan-
ning." The Lovelace court reasoned that financial compensation in
the form of child-rearing expenses is the appropriate method to ad-
dress the parents' financial injury because it was the doctor's negli-
gence that caused them to 'incur those child-rearing costs which they
originally sought to avoids" The Lovelace court further reasoned that
an offset benefits analysis as to this financial injury only 'should con-
sider financial benefits in offsetting the financial costs of raising the
child." According to the court, this is appropriate because the rule as
stated in the Restatement of Torts only allows interests of the same kind
to be offset." Thus, the court explained that the costs of raising the
child should not be mitigated by the emotional benefits conferred on
the parents by the birth of a healthy child.sl° Additionally, the court
explained that parents' motivation for undergoing a sterilization pro-
cedure should not be used to prevent compensation for child-rearing
expenses.s" According to the LoVelace court, a person's motivation for
sterilization should not be conclusive as to whether an economic in-
jury has occurred. 312
The Lovelace court also reasoned that, as a result of the doctor's
negligence, the parents' constitutionally protected right to contracep-
tion and family planning was violated. 313 The Lovelace court found that
there were non -pecuniary harms, such as diminution of attention to
their other children and emotional distress suffered by the parents, as
a result of this injury to their right to family planning. 314 Although the
court thought that submitting those non-pecuniary injuries to an off-
set benefits analysis would be proper in theory, it would result in the
"unseemly spectacle of the parents' attempting to prove how slight or
nonexistent was the psychological benefit derived from the birth of
3°5 See Lovelace Med, Cir., 805 P.2d at 609.
"w See id. at 609, 613.
107 See id. at 610, 612.
148 See id, at app. 620.
3°5 See id.
sw See Lovelace Med: Or:, 805 P.2d at 614. .
311 See id. at 612.
'12 See id.
313 See id. at 612-13.
s14 See id. at 613.
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their child."315 According to the Lovelace court, disputes regarding the
emotional benefits and emotional injuries suffered by parents are not
to be litigated because they are contrary to the public policy of pro-
tecting the emotional well-being of children.316 Therefore, because
the emotional benefits and harms could not be weighed against each
other, the parents should not be able to recover for emotional distress
and other non-pecuniary harms that were the result of the birth of a
child. 317
 Following this reasoning, the Lovelace court emphasized that
in performing the offset benefits analysis, the same interest limitation
of the Restatement should be applied narrowly. 31° Thus, the benefit
from having a healthy child does not mitigate or offset the financial
costs of child-rearing as they are different types of interests. 319
The New Mexico approach to wrongful conception does not take
into account the parents' motivation for undergoing a sterilization
procedure. 32° According to the Lovelace court, a person's original rea-
son for undergoing sterilization is not conclusive as to whether the
parents' interest in their family's financial security was injured. 321 The
Lovelace court provided an example where a professional woman
sought sterilization for non-financial reasons. 322 If the sterilization is
performed negligently and she later becomes pregnant, her financial
prospects might change abruptly.323 Therefore, the professional
woman would be injured financially despite her original motivation. 324
The Lovelace court also noted that, as a practical matter, it would be
very difficult for the jury to identify the parents' motivation. 325
Moreover, using a motivational analysis would encourage "after-the-
fact reformulation of the parents' actual intentions." 326
315 See Lovelace Med. CM, 805 P.2d at 613.
316 See id.
3F See id. at 614. The Lovelace court, however, allowed the other non-pecuniary harms
to he compensated such as pain and suffering associated with die pregnancy and labor. See
id. at 609. The court did not allow the emotional harms associated with the new presence
of the child in the parents' lives to be compensated. See id. at 614.
318 See id.
319 See id.
320 See Lovelace Med. Co:, 805 P.2d at 612.
321 See id.
322 See id.
323 see id,
324 See id,
325 See Lovelace Med. Ch, 805 P.2d at 612.
326 Id.
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N. EVALUATION OF THE MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS
The advantages proposed by the supporters of the motivational
analysis are flawed, Those who propose the use of motivation in the
assessment of child-rearing expenses claim that such analysis is neces-
sary to avoid considering the child as the injury. 327 According to these
critics, under the traditional tort analysis requiring duty, breach of
duty, proximate cause and injury, the unwanted child is viewed as the
injury. 328 As was discussed in Part III, this child-as-injury approach is
what troubles most jurisdictions denying recovery for child-rearing
expenses. 329 This child-as-injury view, however, is not an appropriate
articulation of the situation in wrongful conception cases."° Parents
do not complain. because of the existence of a healthy child in their
lives. 331 Instead, parents are injured because they were not anticipat-
ing the expenses associated with rearing a child whose birth was a re-
sult of negligent medical care.n 2 •
Compensation for child-rearing expenses is not for the unwanted
child but "to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival
will not deprive other members of the family [including the new
child] ... of their just share of the family income.'''" Essentially, par-
ents are injured because they rely on a doctor to perform a non-
negligent sterilization and that was not the result. 33a One court de-
scribed the injury as the mother's continued fertility despite her de-
sire and effort to be sterilized."5 It is difficult to see how the parents'
527 See Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1170, 1197; Pallesen supra note 163, at 375.
328 See Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1197:
329  See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text.
3 3 ° See Ochs V. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883,885-86 (Conn. 1982).
331 See Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463,477 (Ct. App. 1967); Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885-
86 (stating that the parents love fOr the child should not become a reason for denying
them compensation for child rearing expenses).
332 See Gust odio, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77; Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885.
3 3 3 Custodio, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
554 See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez. 805 P.2d 603,609 (N.M. 1991).
3 3  See id. It is important to note that the birth of it child alter a sterilization procedure
is not per se evidence of negligence. See Podewils, supra note 3, at 410. Sterilization proce-
dures are not fool proof. See id. The cases discussed in this note and most wrongful con-
ception cases are cases where negligence has been proven otherwise, negligence has been
admitted by the doctor or has been assumed by the court for purposes of the appeal,
Moreover, in medical malpractice actions doctors are held to the standard of care in the
community. See id. Therefore; negligence would not be proven by showing that. a baby was
horn but by showing that the doctor did not follow standard procedure of those in his
profession and community. See Moore, supra note 3, at 1329-30 (noting that negligence in
the actual performance of the operation is very difficult to discover and prove); Podewils,
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motivation for sterilization would help this analysis. Regardless of
whether the parents seek sterilization for health, social or financial
reasons, they are injured by the doctor in that they are the subjects of
a negligent medical procedure. Motivation has nothing to do with the
injury involved in wrongful conception cases, much less with seeking
compensation for child-rearing expenses.
Proponents of the motivational analysis also suggest that consid-
ering the parents' motivation is helpful because it makes clear to what
extent the parents were injured. 336
 According to proponents, motiva-
don reveals the interests the parents sought to protect when they de-
cided to undergo a sterilization procedure. 337 By ascertaining these
interests, the court is better able to determine whether those interests
were injured by the subsequent birth of the child. 338 Therefore, they
reason that a motivational analysis helps to distinguish between plain-
tiffs who have and those who have not suffered real injury. 339
This motivational analysis is flawed because injury occurs only if
those precise interests were damaged.34° For example, in a motiva-
tional analysis where a parent is sterilized in order to avoid passing on
a genetic defect, the jury could easily find that the birth of a healthy
child was a blessing rather than a damage. 341 This would be the result,
even though the physician was negligent and the parents were unpre-
pared for the pregnancy.342
 The motivational analysis reveals that
since the parents sought sterilization to avoid a genetic defect and
such eugenic interest was not infringed upon by the birth of a healthy
child, the parents were not injured. 343
supra note 3, at 409-11 (discussing ways in which doctors may he negligent in wrongful
conception cases and what is needed to prove it).
336 See Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435-36 (Md. 1984); Milsteen, supra note 164,
at 1170, 1189 (arguing that only after evidence of the parents' motivation is discovered
may the court properly determine the interests involved and thus, award specific damages
for the injury to those interests); Pallesen, supra note 162, at 371, 375.
337 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 667 P.251 1294, 1300
(Ariz. 1983); Jones, 473 A.2d at 434'.
358 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr., 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 434.
Various interests mentioned in court opinions and commentaries are therapeutic
(mother's health or child's health), eugenic (avoidance of a genetic defect), socio-
economic (career or lifestyle) and financial. See Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1190-97.
339 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr., 667 P.2d at 1300;Jones, 473 A.2d at 434.
340 SeeJones, 473 A.2d at 434.
341 See University ofAriz. Health Sciences Or, 667 P.2d at 1300.
342 See id.
343 See id. For further discussion as to how the motivational analysis would evaluate the
outcome of various hypothetical cases, see Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1190-97 and Palle-
sell, supra note 162, at 376-79.
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Some commentators claim that a motivational analysis is particu-
larly helpful to offset benefits jurisdictions because it provides a more
effective way to apply the same interest limitation of the benefits
rule.544 According to these commentators, a motivational analysis
leads to a better application of the benefits rule because, by
specifically identifying the interests involved, the judge and the jury
can discern any benefits to those, interests in order to offset any dam-
ages caused to those interests. 345 This analysis requires accepting the
theory discussed above—that the injury in wrongful conception cases
is the damage to the interests the parents sought to protect by submit-
ting to the sterilization. 346 As discussed above, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the injury has nothing to do with the particular motivation
of the parents.
Even if one subscribes to such a theory, however, one can still see
that a motivational analysis is not necessary to a proper application of
the same interest limitation. The purpose of the same interest limita-
tion is to offset benefits of the same kind with damages of the same
kind. 347 For example, if A tortiously imprisons B and B brings an ac-
tion for false imprisonment claiming damages for pain, humiliation
and physical harm, A cannot offset those damages by claiming that B
obtained large sums of money by selling the story to newspapers. 348
The financial benefits received by B from the false imprisonment—
income from selling the story—is not an interest of the same kind as
the pain, humiliation and physical harm suffered by B during the inci-
denim° Therefore, the same interest limitation as provided for in the
Restatement of Torts has nothing to do with a person's motivation to
perform a specific act."° As demonstrated in the example above, the
same interest limitation could be applied without looking at the per-
son's motivation."' This is, in fact, what some offset benefits jurisdic-
tions have done." 2 These courts have assessed the benefits to be off-
set, not by looking at the parents' motivation, but by looking at a
344 See Milmecni, supra note 164, at 1189-90, 1197; Pallesen, supra note 163, at 371.
345 See Mibleell, Sttpra note 164, at 1197 (arguing that the benefit rule should be ap-
plied to offset any recoverable damages with any benefits conferred upon the interest that
plaintiff sought to protect); Pallesen, supra note 162, at 379.
346 See MilSiCell, SO/pra note 164, at 1189, 1197; Pallesen, sepia note 162, at 371, 379.
347 See. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920, cunt. (b) (1977).
348 See id. at § 920 con. b, illus. 6.
349 See.
35° See id.
351 See id.
552 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Or, 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436-37.
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variety of factors such as family size, parents' age, income, etc. 353 Most
offset benefits jurisdictions have used a motivational analysis primarily
for the purpose of identifying the injury and minimizing the danger
of compensating plaintiffs when no real injury exists. 354 They have not
used the motivational analysis to perform the actual offset benefits
calculation. 355
 The reality is that the use of a motivational analysis
coupled with the same interest limitation would severely restrict the
flexibility the offset benefits approach is striving to accomplish in the
first place.
The motivational analysis also has some inherent weaknesses in
its application. First, there are practical difficulties in deterMining the
precise motivation behind the parents' decision not to have any more
children.356 Second, the fact that the plaintiffs now have to prove mo-
tivation creates another hurdle to recovery even though it is already
extremely difficult to prove liability in wrongful conception cases. 357
In addition, compensating parents that seek sterilization for particular
reasons discriminates against parents who were victims of the same
type of negligence but who sought sterilization for other reasons. 358
Finally, distinctions based on motivation may infringe on constitu-
tionally protected rights to contraception and family planning. 359
A problem presented by this motivational analysis is the practical
difficulty in determining the motivation for undergoing the steriliza-
tion procedure. 36° Couples may decide to limit the size of their fami-
lies for multiple reasons. 361 This is particularly troublesome for juris-
dictions that use nuitivation as the absolute determinant of the injury
because it is unclear how the injury would be determined if a couple
sought sterilization for a combination of reasons. 362 Jurisdictions that
353
 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Or, 667 1'.2t1 at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436-37.
3" See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Cb:, 667 P.2d at 1300 (motivation used to mini-
mize danger of compensating plaintiffs when no real injury exists); Jones, 473 A.2d at 436
(motivation used to identify injury); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d I, 5 (Mass. 1990) (motiva-
tion used to determine if injury existed); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. Ci.
App. 1971) (motivation or purpose of contraception used to identify injury).
355
 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Clr, 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436;
Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5; Troppi, 187 N.1A'.2d at 518.
356 See infra notes 360-70 and accompanying text.
357 See infra not es 371-76 and accompanying text.
358 See infra notes 377-82 and accompanying text.
359 See infra notes 383-89 and accompanying text.
360 See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 828; Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1196-97 (noting that
although the motivational analysis discussed therein neatly segregated the motivations,
they usually overlap); Pallesen, Stlpra note 162, at 375.
361 See Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
362 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5-6 (allowing recovery for financial motivations only).
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use motivation as Merely one factor would still face problems because
it would become extremely difficult to discern if any real injury oc-
curred—the alleged purpose of the motivational analysis. 363
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Troppi v. Scarf acknowledged
that persons seek contraception or sterilization for a variety of rea-
sons-i--financial, career flexibility or health.364 The Troppi court, how-
ever, did not perceive any problem with the variety of motivations. 365
Instead, the variety of motivations justified a flexible approach like
the benefits rule. 366 Yet, courts that have applied the offset benefits
approach modeled after Troppi have used motivation to provide a
more static compensation rule; they have not used it for flexibility
reasons.367 Most courts applying the offset benefits rule have not ad-
dressed directly the practical problems presented when a couple seeks
sterilization for multiple reasons. 368 This leaves unresolved the situa-
tion encountered when simultaneous motivations dictate different
results as to compensation of child-rearing expenses. 369 Although one
commentator has proposed a hybrid motivational analysis in order to
address those situations, such approach likely would undermine the
purpose of the motivational analysis—providing a more accurate and
sensible way of determining damages. 37° Furthermore, a hybrid moti-
vational analysis likely would complicate further the current applica-
tion of the offset benefits rule.
The use of parents' motivation for undergoing a sterilization
procedure as a requisite for compensation for child-rearing expenses
a See Lovelace Med. Ctrs, 805 P.20 at 612 (noting that the motivational rule poses a
difficult task for the jury in sorting out the parents' differing motivations and encourages
after the fact reformulations of the parents intentions).
3" See Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 518; see also supra note 165.
365 See id. at 518-19.
366
 See id.
3°7
	
University of Ariz. Health ScienceS Or., 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436;
Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
" See University of Ariz. Health Sciences OP:, 667 P.2d at 1300; Jones, 473 A.2d at 436;
Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
369 For example, mOst of the literature seems to suggest that those parents who seek
sterilization for eugenic reasons are blessed rather than injured when a healthy child is
born. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where parents seek sterilization both for
financial reasons and fear of transmitting a genetic disease to their offspring. The financial
motivation would seem to dictate recovery for child rearing expenses and the eugenic
motivation would seem to dictate no recovery for child rearing expenses. The current
motivational analysis does not provide a clear solution to this situation.
570 See Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1197. Milsteen did not discuss how such a hybrid
motivational analysis would work probably, the analysis would be extremely complicated
for juries to apply. See id.
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or even as a factor in the calculation of damages creates another bar-
rier to recovery. 371 It is already extremely difficult to prove negligence
in wrongful conception cases, 372
 Adding the parents' motivation as an
element unjustifiably would continue to make it harder for plaintiffs
to prove their case.373 Under a motivational analysis, parents not only
have to prove the elements of medical malpractice and negligence
but they have the burden to prove their motivation for seeking sterili-
zation in order to be compensated for child-rearing expenses. 374
Other tort actions or even medical malpractice actions do not engage
in a similar motivational analysis. The inquiry into a motivational
analysis represents another deviation from traditional tort doctrine in
order to artificially discount the daniages. 373 This does not correspond
with the principle which drives offset benefits jurisdictions—that a
wrongdoer is accountable for all damages that may have been caused
by the tortious misconduct of a defendant. 376
The parents' motivation for undergoing a sterilization procedure
should not be used as the line to determine if they should be com-
pensated for child-rearing expenses. 377 This motivational analysis will
not always produce the most equitable results. 378 If parents with
financial motivations are the only ones able to recover child-rearing
expenses, the analysis would inherently discriminate against those
parents who wish to limit their family size for perfectly legitimate rea-
sons such as preventing a disease or career choices. 379 Parents who
seek sterilization for non-financial reasons similarly would be injured
by the physician's negligence and also suffer the consequences of hav-
ing to support an additional child. 38° Furthermore, such a strong ver-
371 See Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 828 (noting that the requirement that plaintiffs prove
that they chose sterilization for financial reasons is a very difficult burden to meet); fer-
ram, supra note 79, at 1663.
372 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1313; Podewils, supra note 3, at 409-11.
373 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1313; Podewils, supra note 3, at 409-11.
374 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 6; Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 828; jerratn, supra note 79, at
1663.
375 See Podewils, supra note 3, at 424-25.
376
 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr., 667 P.2d at 1300; Janes, 473 A.2d at 435.
377 See Lovelace Med. Ctrs, 805 P.2d at 612.
378 See O'Shea, supra note 80, at 986-89. This article proposes a "reason for reliance"
approach as the most equitable framework. See id, Such analysis however is redundant be-
cause the reason for reliance in the physician's words or assurances is already taken into
account when proving the breach of duty prong of negligence analysis. See id. at 986-89; see
also Milsteen, supra note 164, at 1190-97; Pallesen, supra note 162, at 376-79 (providing
examples of outcomes with different motivational contexts).
379 See Lovelace Med. Cu:, 805 P.2d at 612.
360 See id,
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sion of the motivational analysis seems to disregard the fact that al-
though the parents' original intention was non-financial, they might
face financial hardship later when the child is born."' Most impor-
tantly, however, is the fact that despite a different motivation, parents
wanted to avoid the costs of child-rearing since by choosing steriliza-
tion they had decided not to have any more children.382
Motivation should not be a factor when considering awards for
child-rearing expenses because Consideration of motivation may in-
fringe on the constitutionally protected rights to contraception and
family planning."3 Regardless of motivation, a couple has a constitu-
tional right to procreative autonomy. 884 This interest in limiting family
size was frustrated originally by a doctor's negligence."5 In fact, courts
and commentators justify the recovery of child-rearing expenses be-
cause a doctor's negligence violates these rights. 386
 To employ a moti-
vational analysis in assessing child-rearing damages is tantamount to
disregarding a couple's constitutionally protected rights. 387 The par-
ents are deprived of their right to family planning and contraception
regardless of their motivation for seeking sterilization. 888
 Thus, moti-
vation has nothing to do with whether a person should recover child-
rearing expenses in a wrongful conception case. 389
The motivational analysis used in offset benefits jurisdictions
does not promote the overall goals of tort law—deterrence, compen-
381 See id.
sin see
 Garfinkle, supra note 4. at 826.
383 See Lovelace Med. Ctn, 805 l'.2d at 612-13; Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 821; limn, supra
note 5, at 10911-97.
384 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that constitutional right to
privacy encompasses a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that constitutional right to privacy encompasses single person's
right to contraception);Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that consti-
tutional right to privacy encompasses a married couple's decision to use contraception).
585 See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885; Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 516-17; Lovelace Med.	 805 l'.2d
at 610.
386 See Ochs, 445 A.2d at 885; Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 516-17; Lovelace Med. On, 805 P.2d
at 610.
387 See Horn, supra time 5, at 1097.
388
	 Garfinkle, supra note 4, at 821; nom, supra note 5, at 1096.
3"9 See Lovelare Med. CIE, 805 P.2(1 at 612. Lovelace differs from other offset benefits deci-
sions because it does not support the use of a motivational analysis. See id. Moreover, the
Lovelace court allows the offset-benefits approach as to the emotional and psychological
injuries suffered by the parents. See Id. at 613-14. Therefore, it denies recovery for emo-
tional distress because to them, the emotional and psychological benefits of having a
healthy child does not mitigate that non-pecuniary injury. See id. The Lovelace court, how-
ever, does not apply offset benefits approach as to the financial injury and allows hill re-
covery for child rearing expenses. See id. at 613.
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sation and social welfare. 399 Inasmuch as courts give some considera-
tion to parents' motivation for undergoing a sterilization procedure
in their damages calculation, it does not deter negligent conduct by
doctors.391 The use of a motivational analysis works as another obsta-
cle in finding the doctor liable for all foreseeable consequences of his
or her negligent act. 392 This does not increase the standard of care in
sterilization procedures. 393 This is particularly worrisome when we re-
alize that, in most cases, doctors could avoid easily the negligent act
by providing better post-operative care or more information to pa-
tientS. 394
Another reason why the motivational analysis does not promote
the goals of tort law is that it under-compensates a class of plaintiffs. 395
As was discussed above, in certain situations eugenic and therapeutic
motivations may be seen. as less deserving of child-rearing expenses
compensation even though these parents also are injured by the phy-
sician's negligence. 396 This directly contradicts the primary purpose of
a tort damages award—to restore the plaintiff to her position before
the negligent act.397 Additionally, using motivation does not serve tort
doctrine's compensatory goal because it makes it more difficult and
complicated for plaintiffs to prove their damages. 398 The motivational
analysis is simply a device which reduces the potential liability of phy-
sicians for child-rearing expenses. 399 The purpose of the offset
benefits rule, ironically, is to permit compensation for child-rearing
399
 See Poclewils, supra note 3, at 417-19.
591 See Lovelace Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d at app. 619. But see Frank A. Sloan, Tort Liability and
Obstetiricians' Care Levels, 17 INT'L REV. L. & Ecom. 245 (1997) (reporting that in a Florida
study dealing with obstetricians' pre-natal care, tort liability limited the standard of care of
obstetricians).
592 See Podewils, supra note 3, at 424-25.
593 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1329-30.
5" See Moore, supra note 3, at 1329-30; Podewils, supra note 3, at 419. Moore notes
that all the physician has to do to avoid liability is meet the local fertility standard of care.
See Moore, supra note 3, at 1329-30. This can be accomplished by providing better post-
operative testing for fertility in vasectomy operations or better post-operative monitoring
for tubal ligation cases. See id. A more simple solution, however, is to provide the patients
with better information about the results of the operation. See id.
595 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1328-30; Podewils, supra note 3, at 424-25.
596 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
397 See Podewils, supra note 3, at 407-08.
5" See Moore, supra note 3, at 1328-30; Podewils, supra note 3, at 424-25.
5" But see O'Shea, supra note 80, at 989 (noting that by instructing a jury to give weight
to the purpose of the sterilization, the likelihood of under- and over- compensation is
greatly reduced).
May 20001	 Motivational Analysis in Wrongful Conreptiml Cases	 625
expense000 To create exceptions where certain causes of action are
not bound by traditional tort principles creates uncertainty in our sys-
tem of compensation for injury 40
Filially, permitting courts to consider parents' motivation for
seeking sterilization in calculating damages in wrongful conception
cases does not promote social welfare. 402 This may result in a child
growing up ill-clothed, ill-fed and ill-educated because his or her fam-
ily had to extend their financial resources beyond what they could
afford. 403 Although in most cases parents will adjust to the birth of the
child, there are cases where supporting an additional child can have
serious financial consequences for the family. 4" In University of Arizona
Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, the court described an example
of a husband who, after learning that he had cancer, decided to un-
dergo a vasectomy to avoid the risk of having another child. 405 His
wife became pregnant because the husband's doctor negligently per-
formed the operation and a child was born shortly after the father
died from cancer.'" In a jurisdiction where motivation determines
compensation for child-rearing expenses, the surviving parent would
be denied compensation. 407
 Even in a jurisdiction that uses motivation
as one factor, this parent would have the additional burden of proving
motivation and the damages might be reduced because sterilization
was not sought for purely financial reasons. 408 Such results offend the
sanctity and value of human life, the very notions used by courts to
justify the existence of the wrongful conception cause of action. 4®
CONCLUSION
Although some courts, in their struggle to find a balance between
compensating injured plaintiffs and the public policy considerations
of valuing human life, have relied on a motivational analysis, this ap-
proach does not produce the best results. As a practical matter, it is
extremely difficult to identify and prove motivation for undergoing a
4°° See Ttoppi, 187 N.W.2(1 at 518-19.
401 See Garfinkle. supra note 4, at 830.
401 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1330-31; Podewils, supra note 3, at 425.
ert See University of Ariz. Health. Sciences Ott:, 6t37 P.2(1 at 1299; Ochs, 445 A.2(1 at 884 n.3,
885; Moore, supra note 3, at 1329; Podewils, supra note 3, at 425.
4" See University a [Ariz. Health Sciences Or, 6671'.2d at 1299
4 °5 Sre id.
41)6 See id,
4°7 See Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 5.
408 See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Or, 667 P.2(.1 at 1300.
4°0 See Podetvils, supra note 3, at 425.
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sterilization procedure. Trials become longer and more complicated
in order to find out the exact motivation behind the parents' deci-
sion. Moreover, couples often seek sterilization for many reasons, not
one. This presents the potential problem of having two motivations
dictating different results.
The use of a motivational inquiry places another barrier which
plaintiffs must overcome in order to recover. Wrongful conception
plaintiffs must not only prove the elements of a regular medical mal-
practice negligence action, but also must prove their underlying moti-
vation for undergoing a sterilization procedure.
This additional requirement is another deviation from traditional
tort doctrine, making it harder for plaintiffs to recover and thus dis-
counting child-rearing damages. That does not seem to promote the
basic principles behind tort law—that a wrongdoer he accountable for
all damages foreseeably caused by his act. In addition, those jurisdic-
tions which use motivation as the determining factor for recovering
child-rearing expenses unjustifiably discriminate against those parents
who were not motivated by financial reasons. Motivation should not
be a factor taken into consideration by courts because it has the po-
tential of infringing on the constitutionally protected right to contra-
ception and family planning. By limiting the recovery of child-rearing
damages to certain motivations, courts are implying that other moti-
vations are not legitimate reasons to seek sterilization. A couple has a
constitutional right to contraception regardless of their motivation for
doing so.
A general assessment of the motivational analysis leads to the
conclusion that it does not promote the overall goals of tort law be-
cause it under-compensates plaintiffs and it does not encourage a
higher standard of care for physicians. Ironically,. a motivational in-
.quiry allows some children to go through life ill-clothed, ill-fed and ill-
educated even though the reason for the existence of a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful conception is the preservation of families and the
protection of children.
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